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I. INTRODUCTION
Personal computers, according to Bill Gates, “have become the
most empowering tool we’ve ever created. They’re tools of
communication . . . of creativity . . . and they can be shaped by their
user.”1 In particular, the changing breadth of intellectual property law
reflects the popularity of the Internet and its influence on the American
legal landscape. Current statistics indicate that over 69% of the
population of the United States uses the Internet.2 This represents an
explosion of online computer activity in society. Innovation invites the
potential for abuse, however, and pornography occupies a significant
sector of the Internet marketplace.3 While it is almost impossible to
inventory the wealth of available online data, the prevalence of online
pornography reportedly accounts for 12% of all Internet websites, 25%
of total search engine requests, and 35% of all monthly peer-to-peer
downloads.4 Within these, approximately 100,000 websites offer illegal
child pornography.5
Courts are quick to convict traffickers who market in online
pornographic material involving children, but disagree as to the
appropriate degree of punishment when an offender is released on
probation subject to special conditions imposed at sentencing.6
Specifically, the courts of appeals are divided over sentencing sex
offenders convicted of offenses relating to child pornography.7 Some
courts impose limitations on computer use or Internet access restricted as
1
William Henry Gates III, General Partner, Microsoft Corp., Address at the
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (Feb. 24, 2004).
2
Nielsen/NetRatings dated December 31, 2007 indicate the U.S. Census Bureau
estimates the population of the United States at almost 302 million people, and more than
215 million people reportedly use the Internet. Internet World Stats,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2007).
3
See Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, TopTenReviews.com,
http://internet-filter review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html.
4
Id. The term “peer-to-peer” refers to a network of people who are logged onto a
computer system to share and deliver specified files between them, unlike a client/server
configuration where users download resources from one main computer server.
5
Id.
6
Compare United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 1571 (2002) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Internet was an
indispensable tool in modern society, to impose a blanket prohibition against Internet
access), with United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (remanding to revise
the probationary condition as overly broad because it denied the defendant from using a
computer for research purposes).
7
See, e.g., supra note 6.

190

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:187

a condition of probation while others forbid defendants from any form of
online access.8 Cases throughout the circuits have held both for and
against the restriction, permitting Internet access in some cases only after
probationers seek permission from probation officers.9 Those circuits that
choose to impose a ban on Internet access enforce the condition by
employing a variety of methods to monitor defendants, including
unannounced inspections of an offender’s hard drive, installation of
monitoring and filtering technology on the offender’s computer, and
initiated invitations of pornographic Internet material to offenders.10
The Supreme Court justified the use of reasonable conditions that
deprive probationers of some freedoms by acknowledging that
probationer status removes the “absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled.”11 While this existing jurisprudence indicates a willingness to
limit the First and Eighth Amendment rights of parolees,12 the Supreme
Court has not resolved Fourth Amendment issues implicated by
subsequent monitoring of a convicted defendant’s computer activity.
Consequently, the Internet restriction debate centers on whether it is both
constitutional and practical to enforce a total ban on Internet access.13 In
those courts that do allow offenders restricted access as a condition of
probation or supervised release, one question open to deliberation is
whether the monitoring techniques employed by probation officers
infringe on offenders’ expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.14
The comment argues that current technological monitoring
techniques used to track the computer activities of convicted child
pornographers do not constitute a violation of Fourth Amendment search
8
Compare United States v. Granger, 117 F. App’x 247 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding a
special provision restricting defendant’s use of computers to those without Internet
access, without allowing a probation officer’s exception), with United States v. Holm,
326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a total ban on Internet use as a condition of
defendant’s supervised release was too broad and unnecessarily deprived the defendant’s
liberty).
9
See cases, supra note 8.
10
See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Freeman, 94 F. App’x 40 (3d Cir. 2004).
11
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987), in turn quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972)).
12
See supra note 11, for cases that acknowledge the forfeiture of certain First and
Eighth Amendment rights for parolees who have relinquished full protection by virtue of
their parolee status after conviction.
13
This comment addresses the practicality of enforcing a total Internet ban in section
II.
14
See infra note 49 for a discussion of this point in United States v. Lifshitz, 369
F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004).
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and seizure entitlements. Thus, Fourth Amendment concerns do not
prevent a court from imposing a condition during sentencing that allows
an offender some Internet access through monitoring software that tracks
online activity. However, attempts to police the online activity of those
offenders implicate public policy issues, including re-training costs
which arise when probation officers learn how to enforce the restriction.
These concerns render the probationary restrictions both problematic to
employ and difficult to enforce.
This comment evaluates the efficacy of the current probation
punishment scheme to conclude that punishment solely by the terms of
probation or parole violations is inadequate. In response, the comment
proposes that circumventing government efforts to make safe a
technology following a conviction for viewing, possessing, or
distributing online child pornography should invoke an additional,
independent civil and criminal offense. The comment first addresses
probation as a form of punishment and how different courts of appeals
historically approached a restriction on Internet access as a condition of
supervised release in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The next
section discusses the impracticality of imposing a total Internet ban on
sex offenders. The third section explains current computer surveillance
techniques the government employs to monitor offenders in jurisdictions
that limit Internet access. The fourth section presents the problems of
practicality that accompany enforcement of restricted Internet access in
the probationary context. The fifth section analyzes the credibility
problem that effectively renders a violation of probation an empty threat.
Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as a model,15 the final
section discusses the rise of criminal copyright infringement to propose a
statutory scheme that creates criminal and civil penalties for those
offenders who circumvent the software used to restrict Internet access as
a condition of probation.
II. PROBATION AS PUNISHMENT FOR INTERNET CRIMES
A. Probation and Supervised Release Under the Sentencing Guidelines
Conditional restrictions are authorized by statute as a form of
punishment after conviction under a scheme of supervised release or
probation within the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines”).16 In addition to providing a calculus for actual time in
prison, the Guidelines also inform a judge’s decision to impose a term of
15
16

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006).
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supervised release to follow any prison sentence, or allow the defendant
to return to society for a term of probation subject to attached
conditions.17
Supervised release is allowed only under certain conditions outlined
in the Guidelines.18 Unlike parole, which merely shortens the amount of
prison time served, supervised release is a period of time following the
full term of incarceration.19 While the length of supervision varies
depending upon the underlying crime, section 3583 indicates that
supervision cannot exceed five years for severe crimes.20 These
conditions of release contain both mandatory and discretionary
provisions, permitting a judge to order further restrictions on an offender
who obtains supervised release.21 The Guidelines employ a balancing
approach to ensure that a sentence imposes no greater deprivation than
necessary to afford an offender the opportunity to rehabilitate while
simultaneously protecting the public against recidivism by meeting penal
goals.22
A court imposing a discretionary condition of supervised release or
probation must ensure that the condition is reasonably related to the
factors set forth in section 3553, including: the nature and circumstances
of the offense;23 the need for the sentence imposed, incorporating the
seriousness of the offense and the interest in promoting respect for the
law while providing just punishment;24 the deterrence of further criminal
conduct by the defendant;25 and the protection of the public from further
criminal conduct by the defendant.26 Furthermore, the condition must
involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary”27
for the purposes of deterrence and protection of the public while
remaining consistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission for any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of

17

Id.
Id.
19
Christopher Wiest, Comment, The Netsurfing Split: Restrictions Imposed on
Internet and Computer Usage by Those Convicted of a Crime Involving a Computer, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 850 (2003). The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the Guidelines merely advisory instead of
mandatory in the Federal system, permitting judges a greater degree of discretion during
sentencing.
20
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (2006).
21
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
22
Wiest, supra note 18, at 850.
23
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
24
§ 3553(a)(2)(A).
25
§ 3553(a)(2)(B).
26
§ 3553(a)(2)(C).
27
United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005).
18
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supervised release or probation.28 Hence, courts are cognizant of
remaining within the parameters of the Guidelines when imposing
Internet restrictions as a condition of supervised release or probation for
sex offenders convicted of trafficking online child pornography.
B. Appellate Courts Differ in the Treatment of a Restriction on Internet
Access as a Condition of Supervised Release or Probation
The courts of appeals differ in their evaluations of district court
decisions that employ the option of sentencing offenders to supervised
release or probation with restrictive conditions after convictions for
Internet crimes.29 District courts rely on an ability to impose
discretionary special conditions in order to restrict an offender’s access
to the Internet after a conviction for trafficking online child
pornography.30 Appeals to such conditions historically met with different
results, creating a split among the courts of appeals regarding the
propriety of a denial to Internet access.31 The Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have upheld conditional restrictions on Internet usage for
individuals convicted of sex crimes, while the Second and Eighth
Circuits have reversed Internet restrictions as conditions of supervised
release.32 Different courts of appeals historically addressed restricting
28

§ 3553(a)(4)(B).
See supra notes 6 and 8 for examples of different appellate court rationales in the
probationary setting. In addition, as of September 2007, the Tenth Circuit split with the
Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a presumption of transmission across state lines when
defendants use the Internet. Compare United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir.
2007) (reversing the district court to hold that there is no presumption that an Internet
transmission, standing alone, moves across state lines to satisfy the interstate commerce
requirement in the federal child pornography statute [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006)]), with
United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) and United States v. Runyan,
290 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002) (both allowing the government to satisfy the requisite
interstate commerce nexus through direct evidence of a defendant’s Internet use).
30
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
31
For example, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Granger, 117 F. App’x 247 (4th
Cir. 2004), denied a defendant the use of any computer with Internet access, while the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003), recognized the
defendant’s liberty interest to allow him Internet access.
32
Compare United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003), and United
States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (both upholding an Internet
restriction), with United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversing an
Internet restriction), and United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002)
(reversing an Internet restriction). In June 2007, the Third Circuit vacated conditions of
supervised release against a defendant that imposed an absolute lifetime ban on using
computers and computer equipment with no exception for employment or education,
coupled with a permanent ban against possession of “sexually explicit” books, movies, or
video games. See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that
the condition’s permanency was “the antithesis of a ‘narrowly tailored’ sanction” and that
“[t]he ubiquitous presence of the [I]nternet and the all-encompassing nature of the
29
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Internet access as a condition of supervised release in the context of the
Fourth Amendment.33
In 1999, the Third Circuit in United States v. Crandon34 was the
first to address a restriction on Internet access. The defendant was
convicted of receiving child pornography and challenged a condition of
his probation that denied him access to the Internet unless he sought
specific approval from the United States Probation Office.35 The court
upheld the restrictive condition, considering it reasonably related to the
caliber of the defendant’s offense and the government’s goal of
protecting the public.36
Two years later, in United States v. Paul, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
a blanket prohibition against Internet access for a defendant whose
computer contained over 1,200 images of child pornography and who
used e-mail to advise others on how to gain access to children by
targeting single parents.37 The court accepted a broad restriction that did
not include a provision permitting the defendant to use the Internet with
approval of his probation officer.38 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the
defendant’s argument that the Internet had become an indispensable tool
for communicating in the modern world.39
In contrast, other appeals courts hesitate to embrace restrictions on
Internet access. In United States v. White,40 the Tenth Circuit commented
that the ban imposed there could be acceptable under circumstances

information it contains . . . provides near universal access to newspapers such as the New
York Times; the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post; to popular magazines such
as Newsweek and Time, [to] such respected reference materials as the Encyclopedia
Britannica and World Book Encyclopedia, and [to] much of the world’s literature.”). One
commentator noted that when read literally, the condition would have prohibited the
defendant from ever owning a modern mobile phone or many books including the Bible,
medical textbooks, and modern fiction classics. See Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter:
Court Overturns Man’s Net Ban for Life, CNET, June 6, 2007, available at
http://www.news.com/Police-Blotter-Court-overturns-mans-Net-ban-for-life/21001030_3-6188973.html.
33
See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Holm, 326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003).
34
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
35
Id. at 125. Crandon pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and was later sentenced to seventy-eight months in
prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release.
36
Id. at 128. The court indicated that the restrictive condition was narrowly tailored
and consistent with the defendant’s criminal conduct even though it jeopardized his
employment and impacted his First Amendment freedoms, because Crandon had used the
Internet to develop and exploit an illegal relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl.
37
United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 122 S. Ct. 1571 (2002).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 169–70.
40
244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
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evident in Crandon.41 However, the court remanded the special condition
in its own case back to the district court so that it could be reworded “to
reflect the realities of the Internet and its rapidly changing technology.”42
The court found that the special condition was overly broad and
potentially violated the Sentencing Guidelines by imposing a restriction
“greater than necessary,”43 which denied the defendant’s use of “a
computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a
newspaper online.”44
Building on a concern to tune the scope of restrictive probationary
Internet conditions, the Second Circuit invalidated a special condition in
2004 that required the defendant to submit to electronic monitoring of his
computer by his probation officer in United States v. Lifshitz.45 Noting
that such a condition may be reasonable in certain circumstances, the
court indicated that the current monitoring scheme was overbroad as
imposed.46 The court performed a Fourth Amendment analysis to
conclude that the “special needs” of the probationary system47 justified
conditioning the offender’s probation upon his agreement to submit to
computer monitoring.48 However, the Second Circuit in Lifshitz held that
the broad wording of the probationary condition rendered an analysis of
infringement on the defendant’s privacy impossible, since the court
record provided little information as to the specific system intended to
monitor or filter the computer.49 Furthermore, the court questioned the
efficacy of such enforcement techniques, recognizing that experienced
computer users might circumvent the software, thus reducing the
effectiveness of the government’s justification for implementing those
measures.50
In sum, the Third and Fifth Circuits split from the Second and
Tenth Circuits within a Fourth Amendment justification scheme when
evaluating the scope of restrictive online access imposed by the district
41
The White court explained that Crandon’s use of the Internet “clearly initiated and
facilitated a pattern of criminal conduct and victimization that produced an immediate
consequence and directly injured the victim,” and noted that Crandon could still access
the Internet with permission from his probation officer. Id. at 1205. See supra note 34.
42
Id. at 1206.
43
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
44
White, 244 F.3d at 1206.
45
369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004).
46
Id.
47
The “special needs” were to rehabilitate the defendant and ensure that he did not
harm the community further by receiving or disseminating child pornography during his
term of probation. Id.
48
Id. at 190.
49
Id. at 193.
50
Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 193.
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courts. Courts must tailor the language in each restrictive condition using
authority from the Sentencing Guidelines to acknowledge each
offender’s Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.
C. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Bar Internet Restrictions for Sexual
Offenders Sentenced to Probation
This comment proposes that a restriction on Internet access is a
valid option for any district court sentencing a convicted sex offender to
probation. However, the existing circuit split illuminates two issues.
First, courts must evaluate the degree of any imposed Internet restriction
in the context of each defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to ensure
that the denial is no more than necessary. Second, the courts then must
consider whether the subsequent monitoring techniques put into place by
the probationary condition deny the offender any Fourth Amendment
guarantees against unreasonable searches.
1. Internet Restrictions as Conditions of Supervised Release Do Not
Violate the Offender’s Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy
Though circuit courts split their decisions about the extent of
restricting the Internet for sex offenders who traffic in online child
pornography, the restriction itself does not pose any threat to the
offender’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This is permissible because courts can tailor each
restriction to comport with privacy concerns in any given situation. The
split among circuit courts begins with imposition of a total or partial ban
on Internet access as a condition of probation or parole, and further
deepens the Fourth Amendment analysis for those courts that choose the
partial ban allowing limited Internet access. Courts that impose a blanket
prohibition on Internet access, like the Fifth Circuit in Paul, appear to
focus wholly on the Guidelines by rationalizing that the egregious quality
of child pornography validates the propriety of a total ban.51
Comparatively, courts of appeals reviewing conditions that allow partial
Internet access through restrictive computer monitoring measures
address an additional Fourth Amendment component when analyzing a
probationary special condition. These courts must ensure that the scope
of partial access comports with the privacy rights of the defendant while
simultaneously complying with the principles that drive the Sentencing
Guidelines.52
51

See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001).
The court’s analysis in United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 191 (2d Cir. 2004)
illustrates this task.
52
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2. Under the Supreme Court’s Existing Jurisprudence, Computer
Searches Based Wholly on Probationary Status Would Likely Not
Violate the Fourth Amendment
While the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of
whether a warrantless search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
if the search were solely predicated upon the condition of probation,53 the
Court’s jurisprudence suggests that searches based on probationary status
alone likely do not violate the Fourth Amendment.54
In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court relied on a prior
decision in Griffin v. Wisconsin to assess a case involving a suspicionless
search of an offender out on parole.55 In Griffin, the Court acknowledged
the special role of probation officers: “[W]e deal with a situation in
which there is an ongoing supervisory relationship—and one that is not,
or at least not entirely, adversarial—between the object of the search and
the decisionmaker.”56 The Samson Court incorporated that rationale and
ultimately held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit a police
officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee based solely
on parolee status, suggesting that a condition of supervised release can
eliminate an offender’s reasonable expectation of privacy.57 The Court
noted that parole grants offenders a privilege premised upon compliance
with other requirements.58
Moreover, the Samson Court cited special conditions for parolees,
such as psychiatric treatment and mandatory abstinence from alcohol, as
examples of a parolee’s limited expectation of privacy based on parolee
status alone.59 Akin to probationers, the Court considered the defendant’s
compliance with the parole option to be an equally “salient” factor,
evidencing personal awareness and acceptance that he might be
subjected to suspicionless searches.60 Consequently, the Court concluded
that “imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement [before police officers
could search parolees] would give parolees greater opportunity to
anticipate searches and conceal criminality.”61 The Court concluded that
concerns about an offender’s incentive to conceal contraband merited an
53

Knights, 534 U.S. 112, at 120.
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct.
2193 (2006).
55
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199.
56
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879.
57
Id. at 879–80.
58
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2198 (citing Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)).
59
Id. at 2199.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 2201. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879.
54
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“intensive” system of supervision in Griffin v. Wisconsin, and that these
concerns applied with even greater force to the supervision of parolees.62
Consequently, while the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence
does not explicitly address a condition of probation that restricts
probationer or parolee access to the Internet, it sets a framework that
allows the inference that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated in such
instances. Incorporating the adversarial supervisory relationship of
probation officers and offenders acknowledged in Griffin into Samson’s
limited rights rationale implies that Fourth Amendment rights are not
violated when courts restrict Internet access to offenders granted
supervised release or probation.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF A TOTAL BAN ON INTERNET ACCESS IS
PROBLEMATIC AND IMPRACTICAL
Despite diminished Fourth Amendment concerns, a court still faces
the task of drafting a suitable restrictive condition for an offender living
in a technologically-dependent society. A court considering a condition
of probation must acknowledge the realities of the Internet age while
effectively limiting the offender’s computer activity.63 Circuit courts
allowing restrictive access to the Internet need to uphold the Sentencing
Guidelines by narrowly tailoring special conditions. Conflicting circuits
that promote a total ban on Internet access face additional problems of
practicality when enforcing the blanket prohibition.
Internet technology is so commonplace and convenient that curbing
offender access seems nearly impossible.64 The ease of online
accessibility creates a huge burden on law enforcement when both the
public and private sectors offer Internet access so readily—nearly every
public library and airport offers computers with Internet access, and most
cellular phones now have online capability. Furthermore, hotel rooms,
gyms, and educational institutions provide countless opportunities for
crafty offenders to violate a blanket prohibition on Internet access.
Technological change is so rapid that it is possible to contemplate easier
means of Internet access in the future, even in areas that have yet to
succumb to the digital network.65 A complete bar to online access also
affects the sentencing goal of rehabilitation—probationers are expected
62

Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875; see also United States v.
Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2002).
63
The Tenth Circuit majority made such an acknowledgment in United States v.
White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).
64
See Where Americans Use the Internet, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0921870.
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
65
Some examples include automatic Internet capability wired into every new home,
or free wireless signals on buses or subway systems and in waiting areas of hospitals.
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to secure steady employment, but may be wary of pursuing many clerical
jobs in contemporary society that now offer Internet access. In addition,
employers and potential employees alike utilize online research and
communication resources related to the job search. While not a perfect
solution, however, blocking software may justify a partial ban to restore
the Internet as an acceptable tool a probationer may use to obtain
employment.
The anonymity of the electronic interface is another factor that
precludes effective enforcement of a total Internet ban. Although Internet
access in the employment context is more readily regulated because
employers can bar any probationer from using a computer or going
online, private circumvention of the probationary condition is easily
achieved if offenders merely borrow computers or choose different login
names. The previous section argues that offenders cannot protest a
complete ban on the principle that the Internet’s indispensability dictates
them a right to read a newspaper or book travel arrangements online,
because the “unfairness” argument implicates a quality-of-life assertion
that probationers and parolees are no longer qualified to make. Samson
and other Supreme Court precedent diffuse the argument that because the
Internet is so pervasive, any denied access to it implicates Fourth
Amendment concerns. The rationales put forth by the Supreme Court in
Samson and Griffin indicate that probationers and parolees simply do not
enjoy the same constitutional entitlements as regular citizenry because of
criminal conduct.66 Sex offenders convicted for abusing the Internet
therefore should not expect a right to use it, especially when their
criminal conduct hinged entirely on the technology.
On the other hand, if offenders protest that a condition against total
Internet access is unfair and impractical this contention may be valid
when there is a risk for violation through Internet exposure that is not
within their control, such as at a library, airport, or gym. The ban is
designed to prevent actual Internet activity, however, and most of these
exposures would require further conduct on the offender’s part. Still, the
daily infusion of Internet technology presents many potential
opportunities for an offender to violate probation and law enforcement’s
limited ability to enforce a ban cannot completely alleviate the risks from
an environment rife with temptation.
All courts that contend with sex offenders convicted of trafficking
child pornography on the Internet seek to satisfy the Sentencing
Guidelines by matching punishment to the nature of the crime
66

Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2198 (citing United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
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committed. The goal of those circuits that impose a blanket prohibition
on Internet access is both noble and obvious, but fails to account for the
impracticality of enforcing the condition. The Internet’s dominant role in
society makes monitored restricted access a more viable option for the
courts. Therefore, courts intent on restricting Internet access must specify
technological measures that impose varying degrees of intrusion.
IV. VARIOUS TECHNOLOGICAL METHODS ARE AVAILABLE TO ENFORCE
A RESTRICTION ON INTERNET ACCESS
A survey of current technology highlights the variety of methods
available for probation officers to enforce conditions that permit
offenders partial Internet access. Current technology allows for
flexibility, but also creates opportunities for offenders to circumvent
existing methods. Available enforcement measures include installing
software on an individual’s personal computer and tracking records
provided by the probationer’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).67
A. Software Technology
Software provides an advantage over ISP record-keeping in that
software allows a probation officer or other monitor to investigate all of a
probationer’s computer-based activities for offensive behavior that might
occur without accessing the Internet.68 Installed software can target
specifically-unauthorized materials, or may monitor the computer user’s
activity in the entirety.69 The Second Circuit suggested in United States
v. Lifshitz that “[t]hese [technological] distinctions may be material to
determining whether the scope of the monitoring condition’s
infringement on privacy is commensurate with the ‘special needs’
[analysis used to determine the validity of a condition of supervised
release.]”70
The Second Circuit’s invalidation of the computer restriction in
Lifshitz reflected the court’s concern that the lack of specificity as to the
government’s intended means of monitoring might result in a violation of
what it held to be Lifshitz’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court
explained that “[c]onstant inspection . . . might be more like searching
his diary or inspecting his closets than it is like the highly targeted
diagnosis accomplished by [a monitoring means similar to] drug
testing.”71 The Second Circuit then advocated a monitoring system that
67
68
69
70
71

United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 191 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192.
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would alert a probation officer only when the defendant engaged in
designated impermissible communication over e-mail or the Internet.72
The Lifshitz court emphasized that the scope of any online
monitoring condition must align with the “special needs” of each
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.73 The tools available to
law enforcement allow courts to vary the scope of any condition pursuant
to a probationary Internet restriction. Probation officers use a variety of
software that logs a user’s recent computer activity, actively monitors
current usage, and filters an offender’s access to Internet websites.
1. Forensic Software
Forensic software enables an investigator to collect and recover
stored computer data for later analysis of a user’s cumulative past
activity. Recent technological advancements provide investigators with
the option of physically seizing a computer and examining its contents,
or alternatively logging into a network that provides virtual access to a
user’s computer system. The standard tool widely recognized by the
industry and validated by the courts is EnCase®.74 This software is
offered in two editions that operate by mounting stored data from the
user’s drive into an activity log that is accessed by an investigator
utilizing a private access key.75
The ability of the Enterprise software to run in a live environment
differentiates it from the Forensic edition, allowing the investigator to
log into a network which makes a virtual connection to a target user’s
machine that complies with the investigator’s request to snapshot volatile
data or preview the user’s drive.76 The software encrypts the offender’s
data and is accessible only to specifically authorized parties, to provide a
greater security measure against tampering while establishing a chain of
custody that is admissible in court. The Forensic edition provides the
same evidentiary activity log, but requires a probation officer to
physically access the probationer’s computer to retrieve the usage
report.77
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Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 192.
Id. at 191.
74
JOHN PATZAKIS, DIGITAL PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF
ENCASE ENTERPRISE (2003), http://www.guidancesoftware.com/downloads/getpdf.aspx?
fl=.pdf.
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Id.
76
How EnCase® Enterprise Works, http://www.guidancesoftware.com/products/
ee_works.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
77
PATZAKIS, supra note 74, at 2.
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2. Monitoring Software
Continual monitoring software such as SPECTOR® can
supplement a periodic review of past computer usage. Monitoring
software captures the user’s entire computer by recording all computer
activity including Internet browsing and web-based e-mail services such
as Hotmail, Yahoo mail, and AOL.78 This monitoring program takes a
snapshot of a person’s computer use as frequently as once per second,
holding usage information accrued over several months in a hidden
location for later review by an outside party.79 The automatic snapshot
function mimics a surveillance camera by providing a visual record of
screenshots, while recording e-mail, chat conversations, and user
keystrokes.80 The Professional edition of the software e-mails an
immediate report to a designated recipient once the offender uses any
inappropriate keywords delineated in advance by the subscriber.81 This
notification report contains details of when, where, and how a keyword
was used, including the number of times it was typed or appeared on a
computer, on a website, or in an e-mail.82
3. Filtering Software
Software can filter or block information on an offender’s local
computer or function through an ISP to block user access to
predetermined websites as a probation officer dictates per the terms of
probation. Proxy server programs control network traffic between local
users and the Internet. A probation officer can designate settings that
deny specific file requests from a local user or block inappropriate web
pages and e-mail messages.83 For example, the Lifshitz84 opinion noted in
dicta how an off-site ISP in Bexar County, Texas maintained an
agreement with the local judiciary, providing probationers with Internet
service that restricted access to sex-related sites or other areas expressly
forbidden by conditions of parole or probation.85 The system provides an
alternative software method by interrupting Internet data at the ISP
78
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http://www.webtechgeek.com/Spy-Software.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Proxy Server, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/proxy_server.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2007).
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Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 191 (discussing Ihosvani Rodriguez, Three Sex Offenders
Caught Seeking Internet Porn; Trio Had Agreed To Be Under the Authority of CyberWatchdogs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 28, 2001, at 1A.).
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source rather than via screenshot monitoring or pre-access blocking
methods. All technologies require a skilled probation officer to program
or sort through the resultant data and require strategic planning to keep
pace with resourceful offenders who may attempt to circumvent each
technology. Thus, when tailoring release conditions, courts select from a
technological menu with varying degrees of surveillance options
including activity logs, screen snapshots, and interruptive filtering of
network traffic. Courts must also consider the technological proficiency
of each offender to reduce the potential for circumvention.
B. Flexibility in Software Options Mitigates Potential Privacy Concerns
in the Probationer Context
Just as a court can customize probationary conditions to reduce
privacy concerns when restricting Internet access, applicable methods of
monitoring and restricting are flexible enough to allow custom tailoring
of any probationary condition. Forensic software focuses on past
behavior, and while physical acquisition of an offender’s computer adds
an intrusive element, designating a method such as remote accession to
preview a target drive permits narrow tailoring of a probationary
condition. A probation officer’s ability to search for particularized illegal
activity within a designated computer closely matches the Lifshitz
guidelines, further mitigating Fourth Amendment protests from
probationers subject to restricted Internet access.
C. Skilled Internet Offenders Invite the Potential for Circumvention
While the Fourth Amendment poses no great hurdle to Internet
restrictions, an unwieldy Internet landscape complicated by the
technological prowess of particular offenders threatens every method of
computer surveillance with the potential for subversion. Given the everchanging breadth of sexually-related content available online, probation
officers face the impractical task of staying abreast of myriad
pornographic sites that morph and change on a daily basis in order to
effectively program the filtering software.86 An offender might defeat
monitoring through encryption or steganography, both of which entail
hiding trigger messages within a larger document.87 Moreover, the
proliferation of free proxy websites allows any computer user to hide a
86

ISC Internet Domain Survey, http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/ds/ (last visited
Sept. 15, 2007) (Internet Domain Name survey indicates over 500 million current online
host sites as of January, 2007).
87
Jim Tanner, Rethinking Computer Management of Sex Offenders Under
Community Supervision, 15 J. OFFENDER MONITORING 11, (Summer/Fall 2002), available
at http://www.kbsolutions.com/rcm.pdf.
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personal IP address and surf the Internet anonymously without revealing
the identity of the particular computer.88 Alternatively, offenders can
simply utilize a non-monitored computer to circumvent any condition of
probation. Thus, the various technologies available provide flexible
options but do not resolve the circumvention problem. These realities
reinforce the pressing need for additional deterrents such as specific
statutory civil and criminal penalties for any user who willfully
circumvents monitoring or filtering technology installed as a restrictive
condition of probation.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF A PARTIAL BAN ON INTERNET ACCESS IS POSSIBLE
YET ULTIMATELY PROBLEMATIC
While Fourth Amendment concerns are reduced for those subjected
to partial Internet bans because the judiciary can adjust probationary
conditions for any situational need, attempts to police the online activity
of those offenders invoke the same practical obstacles that arise out of
the total ban scenario. Regardless of the technological method employed,
monitoring the Internet habits of probationers implicates public policy
issues relating to cost, officer qualifications, and practicality, given the
ease of Internet access in daily life and the constant volatility in content.
There are transactional costs that will accompany any monitoring or
filtering method employed with Internet restrictions as a condition of
probation. For example, probation officers must be trained to effectively
enforce the Internet restriction. Proper preparation may demand an
entirely new skill-set of technological awareness. For those courts that do
not restrict Internet access due to its prevalence in today’s society, the
practicality of enforcing special probationary conditions becomes an
issue after a sentence grants law enforcement access to an offender’s
computer.
A. Enforcing an Internet Restriction is Impractical Because the Internet
is Easily Accessible
The proliferation of Internet use within public space makes
enforcement of a probationer’s Internet access potentially unwieldy.
Monitoring and filtering are only useful for activities conducted on a
designated computer. Compliance with an Internet restriction creates an
additional challenge for probationers who may be employed in jobs that
require the use of a computer. Further, Internet access is readily available
from public computers at the public library or even via online access
through cellular phones. New York City has currently contracted with an
88
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Internet Service Provider to make Central Park a hotspot with free
wireless Internet access.89
The effects of restricting the Internet for a probationer are useless if
the user cannot be identified when using a different computer.
Techniques will accommodate this truth in ways that affect greater
society. Enforcing a restriction by blocking access to specific sites at the
public library, for example, might deny the general public fair use simply
because of a potential for abuse by probationers and parolees.90 The
resultant public policy would create a perversely tightened and restrictive
Internet environment for the masses who have not voluntarily
relinquished rights through the commission of a crime.
B. Enforcing an Internet Restriction is Difficult Because Technology is
Volatile
The limitations of current technology cannot always satisfy the
judicial scope of Internet monitoring in conditions of probation or parole,
further reducing the efficacy of restrictive conditions. While courts may
craft monitoring conditions of probation that satisfy the jurisprudential
scope of an Internet restriction, actual implementation is unwieldy and
impractical. Proponents of the Internet ban as well as its detractors agree
that the development of forensic search technology is uncertain at best
and subject to immediate counter-strategies devised by savvy hackers.91
The sheer number of rapidly changing forensic programs further
complicates the practicality of enforcing an Internet ban.92 The best tool
for a particular situation greatly depends on its cost and ease of use, as
well the skill of the particular officer using it.93
C. Adequately Enforcing an Internet Restriction Often Requires
Specialized Training for Probation Officers
Offenders may possess computer knowledge that far surpasses that
of their probation officers. This invites a game of “cat-and-mouse”94 to
epitomize the potential futility of relying on technological methods to
89
Sewall Chan, Deadline Set for Wireless Internet in Parks, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2006, at B1.
90
Arguably, the general public could be denied access to sites that are not
pornographic in nature but are nevertheless blocked to prevent access to probationers
because the sites contain images of children or offer particular items for sale.
91
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
570 (2005) (referring to computer hackers who have the technological prowess to
immediately circumvent new monitoring techniques).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 579.
94
Id. at 570.
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adequately enforce an Internet restriction. Thus, monitoring and filtering
the Internet for probationers and parolees by permitting such individuals
to live outside of prison introduces a new task of balancing the price of
enforcement against the dual goals of deterrence and rehabilitation where
individual privacy and public safety is no longer the primary issue. By
relaxing Fourth Amendment concerns for probationers and parolees,
courts remove the dreaded fact-finding burden that would require them to
cull the latest technologies in order to prescribe the least-invasive
monitoring techniques for a probationary condition of release. Courts
also avoid the potential for a clogged judiciary when defendants like
Lifshitz return to court to request modifications to supervisory conditions
in the face of cutting edge technology that would reduce an infringement
on their Fourth Amendment rights. In order to impede an offender’s
potential to violate the Internet restriction, conditions should clearly
mandate that the offender use only specially-designated computer
terminals, perhaps in conjunction with random drop-in visits and
continual technological surveillance by probation officers.
1. The Colorado Training Scenario
The state of Colorado spearheaded an effort to develop an intensive
two-day technical training program for probation officers at the Rocky
Mountain location of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center (“NLECTC-Rocky Mountain”).95 The course builds
on the notion that there is no known cure for sexual deviancy and
furthers the goal of containing an offender’s deviant impulses by using
programs that help identify thinking errors, recognize risk factors in the
environment, and develop skills to control online behavior.96 The training
teaches officers how to frame the conditions of probation to allow the
probation agency the right to search an offender’s computer at any
time.97 The program coincides with a writing in which the offender
agrees not to view pornographic materials online and concedes that he is
responsible for any data found on the computer.98 The computer user
signs a form that indicating that “(s)he has “no expectation of privacy
regarding all computer use and/or information stored on his/her

95
“Monitoring” the Sex Offender, TECHBEAT, Winter 2005, at 5, available at
http://www.nlectc.org/pdffiles/tbwinter2005.pdf.
96
Id.
97
Michelle Gaseau, Sex Offender Supervision and Technology, CORRECTIONS
CONNECTION NETWORK NEWS, June 13, 2005, available at http://corrections.com/news/
article/5000.
98
Id.
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computer.”99 This scheme employs a contract theory of law between the
government and the probationer, the “consideration” being probation
instead of jail or an accepted shorter jail term in exchange for conditional
supervised release.
The NLECTC-Rocky Mountain also provides free software for
probation officers to detect electronic violations of probation.100 The
software reviews an offender’s hard drive and generates reports that are
admissible in court and can be printed or e-mailed to others.101 In
addition, the officer learns to apply a treatment review protocol to
manage the offender under the supervision goals established within the
initial agreement.102 The offender is continually mapped for adaptive
treatment in an effort to prevent the offender from misdirecting the
supervision team over time.103 Officers participating in the program
install monitoring software on the offender’s computer which scans and
captures photographic images and text, generating a report before the
officer wipes the computer as a blank slate for the next scanning
session.104 However, while officers learn the basic capability of forensic
software to track offender activity, they are not trained to recognize
technical circumvention of any particular monitoring program.
Contrary to the traditional law enforcement approach to computer
forensics which treats a hard drive as a historical record of evidence for a
crime that has already occurred, probation and parole officers are
oriented to approach the offender’s computer usage with methods of
monitoring to prevent repeated crime.105 Software runs periodic checks
of the hard drive to determine if there has been any violation of the
probationary condition or if a new crime has been committed.106 The
driving principle behind this method parallels the rationale behind drug
testing, which theorizes that while offenders may beat a particular
instance of computer monitoring, users who continue to violate will
eventually get caught.107
The added cost to train and qualify probation officers to handle the
particular demands of the sex offender Internet probationary condition
99
To view the complete terms of a sample agreement, see http://www.kbsolutions.
com/intakeagr.pdf.
100
Gaseau, supra note 97.
101
Id.
102
KB Solutions, Structured Sex Offender Treatment Review Overview,
http://www.kbsolutions.com/html/ssotr.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
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signals one obvious drawback of the Colorado model. The “cat-andmouse” analogy animates the constant evolution of technology, where
offenders frequently have more computer literacy than those monitoring
them, increasing their prowess by exchanging ideas and methods to
dodge monitoring during time spent in prison or through other
networks.108 Additionally, while probation officers are comfortable
understanding the personal factors from any one case that may lead to
criminal behavior, the Internet contains many unorthodox dangers that
complicate the risks each officer must manage. Joe Russo, program
manager for corrections at the NLECTC-Rocky Mountain, elaborated in
one article that “[o]fficers are used to dealing with offenders’ addictions,
joblessness, and family relationships; now they must also deal with
online pornography, sex chat rooms and discussion boards, and dating
services that target vulnerable, single-mom families with the ‘right type’
of children in the household.”109
2. The Cost of Training Probation Officers Inhibits the Efficacy of a
Probationary Condition
The NLECTC-Rocky Mountain began offering its courses without
fees in 2004, but many interested out-of-state agencies did not have the
travel budget necessary to send officers to the training site.110 The current
program offers training throughout a ten-state region to key agencies and
participants that can provide appropriate computer labs.111 As of summer
2006, more than 440 probation officers in sixteen states received
training.112 Although regional training consolidated part of the costs to
prepare probation officers for their task of monitoring sex offenders in
this instance, economic factors surrounding restrictions on Internet
access will spur additional public policy analysis within the circuit
courts.113 Enforcing an Internet ban as part of a probationary condition
for a sex offender creates many difficulties in actually controlling
offender behavior while implicating policy concerns of cost and
efficiency. Therefore, the criminal justice system cannot rely on
probationary conditions alone to adequately deter and punish these
criminals. Limited bans are possible, but not practical, due to the
volatility and availability of the Internet and the costs for training
108
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probation officers to enforce judicially-imposed conditions. Additional
statutory civil and criminal penalties are necessary to thwart offender
circumvention problems not resolved by technological monitoring
measures.
VI. PUNISHMENT SOLELY BY THE TERMS OF A PROBATIONARY
CONDITION IS NOT ADEQUATE
Theoretical analysis and statistical data indicate that probationary
conditions are not effective psychological deterrents for many
criminals.114 Consequently, a new model of punishment is necessary to
bolster the repercussions that follow a conviction for trafficking child
pornography on the Internet. The circumvention sanctions in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act115 provide a viable sample punishment regime
that punishes as a separate crime any effort to circumvent detection.
Following this model of intellectual property law, the analysis below
offers several reasons why offender activity that circumvents the
government’s filtering or monitoring efforts to make safe computers
should be treated as an additional and independent civil or criminal
offense. The consequences for probationers who circumvent monitoring
or filtering software are not likely to include incarceration. Hence,
probation as a sole remedy suffers from a credibility gap that would
benefit from additional independent statutory punishments to boost its
deterrent power.
A. Violators of an Internet Restriction as a Condition of Probation Are
Unlikely to Face Prison
In general, offenders who violate imposed conditions of probation,
or parole under supervised release suffer consequences that are equal to
or less than the original crime committed.116 A term of probation or
supervised release commences when the sentence begins.117 Probation
officers have statutory authorization to petition for revocation of
probation118 for any violation of a probationary condition that occurs at
any time before completion of the probationary term.119 Depending on
the nature of the violation, the Sentencing Guidelines permit the

114
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sentencing court to revoke probation and impose a prison sentence120 or
to continue probation with the option to extend its term or modify the
conditions of release.121
When determining a punishment for revocation under the
Guidelines, a sentencing court must determine the grade of the violation
under section 7B1.1.122 A judge has discretion to choose the more serious
punishment for the crime under either federal or state punishment
regimes.123 Further, courts must grade the violation by taking into
account any recidivist provisions a defendant may face if the court
charges him with a particular offense.124 The Sentencing Commission
also resolved a circuit split to clarify that where a defendant is sentenced
for a new offense after revocation of parole or probation, the district
court should impose the new sentence to run consecutively with the
revocation sentence. 125
Courts have some discretion to revoke or revise a defendant’s term
of probation within the bounds of the Sentencing Guidelines;126 however,
Congress created a basis for mandatory revocation only for offenders
who possess firearms, refuse to submit to drug testing, and, most
recently, for those who return multiple positive results on drug tests.127
Accordingly, offenders convicted of child pornography do not face
mandatory prison time for the violation of any condition of probation.
B. Probation’s Punishment Reputation Suffers from a Credibility Crisis
Current punishment schemes wield threats of increased probation or
incarceration if offenders violate conditions of probation, but the
criminal justice system suffers from a credibility crisis that feeds
probationer recidivism.128 According to the Center for Civic Innovation
at the Manhattan Institute, the criminal justice system’s reputation suffers
from a lack of legitimacy as perceived by both the general community
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and the offender.129 The American population channels its fear and
morality into punishment as the centerpiece of policy for crime
control.130 Our societal view is that while punishment and incarceration
controls crime, the system should gauge the relativity of threats to public
safety and wager accountability for lower-level non-violent offenders via
probationary supervision.131 However, frequent instances of probation
violations without sufficient consequence have devalued the public’s
opinion of probation over the decades.132 In effect, both society and
criminals do not credit the probation system as an effective means of
offender deterrence for crime control.
Sheer case volume contributes to the credibility problem—
probation officers are overloaded with hundreds of cases to manage, each
requiring a varying degree of supervisory control.133 Many probation
departments are under-funded and woefully understaffed with very little
interagency cooperation.134 These logistical impairments result in a
certain measure of passivity in case management. Traditional supervision
fails to adequately supervise or hold violators accountable, which allows
many probationers to avoid meaningful consequences if they violate
probationary conditions.135
Consequently, many offenders have officially “absconded” by
failing to maintain contact with their probation officers, and the system
exerts little effort to track absconders or otherwise bring them to
justice.136 For those criminals who agree to follow probationary
conditions that attempt to control behavior, there is little public
confidence that those offenders will truly be held accountable should
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they fail to live up to the prescribed demands.137 Our system of probation
must redefine its image so that probation officers have sufficient
credibility to impart a viable threat of punishment as a consequence of
violating probationary conditions.138 Until that point, violators are free to
revel in blame, denial of wrongdoing, refusal to accept responsibility,
and failure to acknowledge the impact of their behavior on others.139
C. Non-Violent Computer Criminals Arguably Perceive Probation’s
Weaknesses
Though statistics on probationer recidivism focus mostly on violent
criminals,140 the punishment scheme’s credibility crisis extends to nonviolent offenders who commit computer crimes.141 Currently, the
judiciary tends to impose probation with some form of Internet
restriction on child pornographers who trafficked in a low number of
offensive images.142 If this “mild” offender violates a monitoring
condition by accessing pornography that is detectable, for example, by a
screen capture or by disabling a keystroke monitor, the legal
repercussion will likely contain a reprimand and an extension of the term
of probation with a tightened monitoring regime. The offender is apt to
believe that courts do not want to burden an already overcrowded prison
population with a low-level offender, so the violator may capitalize on
this vulnerability to exploit it. Thus, the punitive deterrent effect of
computer monitoring is arguably lost on low-level offenders.143
Further, a facetious attitude toward probationary conditions of this
sort potentially infects every incarnation of low-level offender. A
technologically illiterate offender familiar with the realities of the
criminal justice system might still comprehend that the system is too
burdened to imprison him, and so he may consider the possibility of
actual punishment for circumventing any computer monitoring an empty
threat. Comparatively, an offender who possesses highly sophisticated
technical computer knowledge may circumvent monitoring methods
based on an arrogance presumption that he can evade detection by
137
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employing his own software wizardry past his probation officer’s
sporadic and ineffectual enforcement techniques. Even if this educated
offender humbly acknowledges some measure of efficacy from forensic
monitoring techniques, he still may share the simpleton’s attitude that
likelihood of actual punishment is minimal should he choose to access
child pornography through the Internet.
D. Alternative Forms of Punishment Are Not Suitable Options for the
Non-Violent Computer Criminal
Another judicial remedy is clearly necessary if the punitive threat
for violating probation does not intimidate computer criminals into
compliance with governmentally-imposed anti-circumvention methods.
Because the public seeks more punishment and accountability for
offenders, but does not necessarily agree that putting non-violent
probation violators in prison is a solution, there remains a paradox of
public opinion.144 Scholars have proposed experimentation with
alternative forms of punishment as substitutes for incarceration to
broaden the criminal justice system beyond its traditional penitentiary
scheme.145 Examples of alternative punishments include sentencing an
airport handler convicted of theft to clean out the horse stalls at police
stables,146 and broadcasting photographs of people arrested for
prostitution offenses on local television.147 These measures exemplify the
alternative punishment notion of “shaming,” whereby the offender is
forced to “go public” to endure some form of humiliation that imposes
accountability for the offensive conduct. The hope is that “shaming
sentences, especially those sentences requiring an apology or confession,
may fulfill the basic principles of restitution.”148
144
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apparently wants more punishment. On the other hand, the citizenry does not want nonviolent offenders in prison, and they favor, sometimes strongly, the use of alternatives to
incarceration.”).
145
Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1875
(1998) (“Experimentation with alternative punishments must occur now, not only
because crimes and criminals are diverse and may require differing treatments, but also
because the current demographics of the prison system simply cannot be sustained in the
long run.”).
146
Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1967, 1981
(1998).
147
See Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 145, at 1872
(referring to “John TV” in Kansas City, Missouri where a local government channel
broadcasted the photographs and biographical information of persons arrested for
offenses related to prostitution).
148
See Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 146, at 1973.

214

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:187

Many opponents of “shaming” criticize its ability to reform
criminal behavior149 and question its functionality; because “degrees of
shame are difficult to quantify,”150 there is no guarantee that the offender
experiences true accountability after enduring the alternative punishment.
Employing a “shaming” scheme as punishment for circumvention of
governmentally-imposed computer monitoring invokes these problems.
The restitution principle driving the ideology does not square with a nonviolent offense such as software circumvention because there is no
tangible “victim” that can benefit from an apology or a confession. One
who disables a keystroke monitor to access child pornography commits a
wrong to the justice system as a whole by failing to uphold his
probationary agreement. However, it is difficult to craft an effective
alternative through “shaming” which focuses on the “victim,” short of
ordering the offender to mop up the local courthouse floors.
Moreover, an offender convicted of possessing child pornography
has already suffered the consequence of public humiliation from that
crime during his original conviction. Notice to others of his continued
indulgence in the egregious behavior via an alternative “shaming”
punishment will not likely faze him to the degree necessary to truly
punish or prevent future circumvention activity. In fact, the focus on the
offender as a pariah is notably diluted after conviction if he circumvents
monitoring software, because the humanistic dimension driving society’s
emotional response to the reprehensible content of the original offense is
replaced with a concentration on the illegal technological intricacies
involved in the circumvention crime.
Finally, there is no evidence that the threat of public “shaming”
would provide any level of reform or serve as a deterrent to make
offenders reconsider a potential act of circumvention.151 Not only does
the anonymity of the Internet work to conceal the identity of the user, but
it also obscures the identities of the victims. Those who traffic in child
pornography are unlikely to actually know or encounter the children in
the images they share. Without a personal connection or stake in the
activity, these offenders will not feel any sting of punishment that seeks
to take advantage of conscience or reputation.

149

Id. at 1972.
Id. at 1971.
151
Shaming is most effective when accompanied by restitution to a victim. See
Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 146, at 1973. But there is
arguably no cognizable victim in the context of restricted Internet access for non-violent
computer criminals, thus reinforcing the idea that shaming is not an appropriate
punishment for this type of probationary violation. See supra note 146.
150
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Even if “shaming” were a suitable option for non-violent offenders
who violate conditions of probation, those who support alternative
punishments comment that federal courts face particular barriers and
constraints in employing the measures.152 These commentators explain
that judges are often bound by the system: “[t]he combination of the
[Federal Sentencing] Guidelines and the statutorily mandated minimum
sentences for many federal crimes does not regularly leave judges the
option to experiment with various terms of probation.”153 The Guidelines
create four “zones” that determine the baseline range for any sentence,
combining an offender’s past criminal history with the offense level of
the crime committed, as determined by statute, affording judges little
discretion to impose alternative punishments beyond first-time nonviolent offenses.154 Furthermore, over one hundred federal laws require
mandatory minimum sentences that trump the sentencing ranges in the
Guidelines.155 Thus, judges cannot rely on their discretionary powers
alone to craft effective deterrent measures within conditions of probation.
Clearly, alternative punishments designed around “shaming” are
inadequate to prevent and punish circumvention of software technology.
“Shaming” has been criticized for its inability to reform and its
constrained use under the Guidelines. Without an alternative punishment
scheme, current consequences provide little deterrence to probation
violators because they are unlikely to face prison sentences, reinforcing a
credibility gap which extends to non-violent offenders such as computer
criminals. A new statute that criminalizes software circumvention and
establishes additional civil penalties will fortify the consequences of
violating a probationary condition that restricts Internet access after a
conviction for trafficking online child pornography.
VII. CREATION OF SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
OFFENSES IS THE PROPER PUNISHMENT SOLUTION
The creation of separate and independent criminal and civil
offenses is an effective solution to deter circumvention of probationary
restrictions for computer crimes. Statistics are clear that monitoring
computer activity alone will not suffice to deter circumvention efforts
that overcome restricted Internet access.156 According to Department of
Justice figures, the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to shut down a
proliferation of child pornography websites or web hosts in Fiscal Year
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 1983.
Id.
Id. at 1985.
Id.
See infra note 157.
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2006, instead dismantling less than half of its 2,300 target goal.157 Recent
child predator activity on social networking sites such as MySpace
demonstrates how Internet content providers arm offenders with more
opportunity to pursue illegal sexual activity than ever before.158 The
expanding costs of re-training probation officers to comply with
conditions of supervised release that involve Internet monitoring further
the need to supplement such measures with enhanced statutory penalties
for software circumvention.
While the Sentencing Reform Act clearly prohibits a defendant
from committing an additional federal, state, or local crime,159 judicial
interpretation holds that a probation officer’s petition for revocation of
supervised release must specify a clear statutory provision for the alleged
violation.160 The lack of existing statutory penalties for circumventing
computer technology undermines the purpose of a restrictive
probationary condition, since probation officers cannot utilize the
violation as leverage to control the offender’s computer habits. The
typical penalty for a clear violation of a statute is often a return to prison
to serve out the remainder of a sentence.161 Consequently, the creation of
statutory criminal and civil penalties that target circumvention of
computer monitoring technology would significantly bolster the deterrent
power of probation by arming it with an effective threat of strict liability
incarceration.
Moreover, child pornography is a toxic issue for juries; it results in
unsettling litigation that often involves graphic visual evidence. Any
measure that reduces jury exposure to explicit evidence would benefit all
participants in the judicial system.162 Prosecutors and defendants alike
157
Only 906 child pornography websites were shut down in Fiscal Year 2006,
according to the United States Department of Justice. See FY 2006 Performance and
Accountability Report, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2006/P1/p10.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007).
158
See, e.g., Matt Richtel, MySpace.com Moves to Keep Sex Offenders Off of Its Site,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at C3 (indicating that MySpace.com is “developing
technologies that would help combat the use of its site by sexual predators by crossreferencing its more than 130 million users against state databases of registered sex
offenders.”).
159
See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(1), (3), (6), (7) (2006).
160
See United States v. Chatelain, 360 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Havier, 155 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998).
161
Department of Justice statistics demonstrate that only 23% of prisoners
incarcerated for probation or parole violations were sent to prison for technical violations.
The remaining 77% were incarcerated for committing new crimes while under
community supervision. See the Office of Justice Programs statistics, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ppvsp91.txt (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
162
Mock jurors were more likely to feel emotional distress and reported physical
reactions in response to viewing graphic photographs. See Kevin S. Douglas, David R.
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could rely on the assurance from a bright line strict liability regime that
informs a defendant—at his original sentencing stage—of the additional
consequences that would follow any attempt to circumvent the
monitoring technology imposed at sentencing. The gravity of computer
crimes involving child pornography sharpens the government’s policy
interest in punishing child predators, justifying the fortification of
probationary conditions through independent statutory penalties against
circumvention of software monitoring technologies.
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is an Appropriate Model for a
New Statutory Scheme
This comment suggests that the appropriate statutory model for a
software circumvention punishment scheme is the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which created a new category of copyright
law in 1998 criminalizing any producer or distributor of technology that
functions to circumvent protected access to copyrighted works.163 The
statute carves out exceptions for lawful investigations and intelligence
activities by authorized government officials.164 Applying the same
principle to probationary restrictions on Internet access, any
circumvention of surveillance techniques for the law enforcement
purpose of enforcing the condition could become an independent cause
of action that incurs its own parallel penalties.
1. The Rise of Criminal Copyright Infringement
Traditional copyright law treated infringement as a minor criminal
wrong, envisioning a one-year imprisonment term for misdemeanor
offenses such as unlawful dramatic and musical performances.165
However, amendments to the 1909 Copyright Act in 1976 and again in
1982 revamped the criminal provisions to create a felony-class offense
for certain types of first-time willful infringing uses.166 Congress
responded to the growth of the Internet and the ease of online
infringement in 1997 with its passage of the No Electronic Theft Act,
widening the scope of felony criminal copyright infringement to include
Lyon & James R. P. Ogloff, The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock
Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
485, 485 (1997).
163
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
164
§ 1201(e).
165
Laura Gasaway, Criminal Copyright Infringement, INFORMATION OUTLOOK, April
2004, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FWE/is_4_8/ai_n6108144.
166
Id. (noting that the 1982 amendment classified certain activities as felonies
depending on the number of infringing copies made or sold with a 180-day period, and
increased penalties up to five years in prison and $250,000 in fines).
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a maximum prison term of one-year imprisonment for first-time
infringers that were not seeking commercial gain.167 The criminal
treatment of purposeful infringement of copyrighted material for
personal as well as commercial use was enhanced in 1998, when
Congress enacted the DMCA to provide criminal penalties for activities
that lead to infringement.168
The act of circumventing technological protection is defined within
the DMCA as “avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise
impairing a technological measure.”169 The DMCA refers to technology
such as video cassette recorders and computer software.170 The statute
controls access to copyrighted works to prevent infringement, penalizing
manufacturers of circumvention technology as well as users, to maximize
the threat of infringement liability.171 Section 1203 provides for civil
remedies that include actual damages as well as any additional profits
earned by the violator.172 Provisions allow a complaining party to elect
statutory damages for each circumvention violation in a range of $200
through $2,500 “per act of circumvention, device, product, component,
offer, or performance of service, as the court considers just.”173 Financial
statutory penalties increase within a range of $2,500 through $25,000 for
attempts that induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal copyright
infringement.174 The current act builds in seven limited exemptions that
allow circumvention of access and copy controls for certain activities
such as educational and research tasks.175 The entirety of section 1201 in
the DMCA is known as the anti-circumvention provision. As of May
2007, the Department of Justice introduced a bill that will potentially
permit a judge to award damages for each separate piece of a copyrighted
work rather than applying the infringement analysis to an entire work or
compilation.176 Consequently, law enforcement officials appear poised to
expand these provisions.
167

Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000), which indicates that a commercially
motivated infringer may receive a federal prison term of five years and $250,000 in fines,
whereas a non-commercial infringer is subject to a one-year prison term and $100,000 in
fines. Repeat infringers may receive a ten-year federal prison term for commerciallymotivated infringements, and up to six years for noncommercial infringements.
168
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2006) (making it a criminal violation to circumvent
encryption codes set in place to prevent copying).
169
§ 1201(b)(2)(A).
170
See § 1201(k), 1201(b)(1).
171
See § 1201(b)(1).
172
17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(1)(a) (2006).
173
§ 1203(c)(3)(A).
174
§§ 1202, 1203(c)(3)(B).
175
§ 1201(d)–(j).
176
Posting
of
Derek
Slater
to
Electronic
Frontier
Foundation,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/005381.php (July 26, 2007, 16:48 EST) (referring
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2. Criminal Sanctions Are Ideal for Violations of Probationary
Conditions Based on Restricted Internet Access
The expanded criminal statutory scheme within the DMCA has
endured a share of criticism for its danger of chilling creative
development of new ideas or products at the expense of forming a social
norm against conduct that is not currently viewed as immoral.177 In
practice, initial criticism waged against the DMCA’s anti-circumvention
provision considered it bad public policy, due to its weak enforcement
record178 and ineffectual application to overseas activity.179 Criminal law
necessarily evolves to respond to changes in technology and society,
based on concepts of preventing harm to the community and condemning
behavior generally regarded as immoral.180 Criminalization in the
copyright infringement context is not an effective deterrent because
scores of people continue to copy while the evolving legal standard
selects only a small handful of violators in an unsuccessful attempt to
build a shared moral code against infringing activity.181 Further, a
deterrence effort through criminalization is most understandably justified
when there is a cognizable harm to the protected person, but when people
only infringe for personal use, linking a causal harm to infringement is
speculative at best because other factors may account for sales declines,
since personal use does not impact market share.182

to the Intellectual Property Enhanced Criminal Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 3155,
110th Cong. (2007)), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1103155 (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
177
Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based
on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 774 (2003) (explaining
how courts are “generally cautious when deciding whether conduct in which citizens
routinely engage [copying copyrighted material for personal use] is a crime.”).
178
Eric Goldman, ‘No Electronic Theft Act’ Proves a Partial Success, NAT’L L.J.,
March 17, 2003, at B9, available at http://www.ericgoldman.org/Articles/nljnetact.htm
(noting how the limited number of criminal copyright prosecutions to that date—eight in
five years—demonstrated the DMCA’s weak power of deterrence and unpredictable
sentencing).
179
Laura Gasaway, Enforcement of DMCA Criminal Penalties Suffers Setback,
INFORMATION OUTLOOK, March 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m
0FWE/is_3_7/ai_99011612 (discussing United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d
1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002), a case that represented the first criminal prosecution under the
DMCA’s anti-circumvision provision, in which the jury acquitted a Russian computer
programmer of all charges, partially because there was no proven intention to violate
United States law).
180
See Moohr, supra note 177 at 751.
181
Id. at 776 (referencing the “Napster experience” to illustrate the “ineffectiveness of
legal prohibitions in forming social norms” while consumers continue to engage in
infringing activity such as file sharing).
182
Id. at 753–55.
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In contrast, the traditional criminal punishment setting is wholly
appropriate for independent statutory civil and criminal penalties that
condemn software circumvention efforts. Forming social norms through
criminal laws is most compelling when it is based on an existing moral
code.183 Unlike the copyright setting, using criminal sanctions to forge a
new community norm is unnecessary in the probationary context,
because crime and conviction are openly acknowledged responses to
violations of established societal norms; the additional sanctions serve as
a complementary deterrent measure to promote understood societal
expectations. In addition, the harm to the community can already be
characterized as a general threat to public safety and stability when the
new (probationary) violation is connected to conduct from a prior
criminal conviction, regardless of the nature of the violation itself. The
harm falls within the conventional notions of punishment when the
perpetrator is an already- convicted offender with clear notice of the
conditions he must adhere to within the parameters of the initial
probationary sentence.
3. The Application of the DMCA Model is Appropriate for a New
Statutory Scheme Aimed at Offenders Who Circumvent Forensic
Monitoring Techniques
Applying the underlying principles and statutory scheme from the
DMCA, punishment for circumventing forensic monitoring software
should be a separate and independent violation of a probationary term.
Computers, like the technologies addressed by the DMCA, serve a dualuse function. They are unique tools for research and structuring
information, but also carry the potential to perform criminal acts.
Congress has the constitutional grant of power to enact a strict liability
regime that addresses particular software circumvention techniques by
sex offenders whose restricted access to the Internet derives from Federal
Sentencing conditions of probation.184 The government has a compelling
interest in preventing crime. It can sidestep any opponents who question
congressional regulation of the Internet by arguing that the punitive
scheme is not an attempt to control Internet content in general—a proper
rebuttal would indicated that the statutory scheme encompasses a
narrowly-tailored effort that is deeply-rooted in the sentencing and
punishment of specific online sexual offender conduct in particular.185
183
Id. at 777 (citing various texts that discuss the retributivist theory of criminal
punishment and the interplay between community values and the law).
184
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
185
Some policy analysts, such as the Cato Institute, fear a chilling effect from any
Federal Communications Commission regulation that attempts to regulate Internet access
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In enacting additional penalties for circumvention activity, for
example, Congress could copy the civil remedy structure from the
DMCA to impose financial obligations on an offender who disables a
keystroke detector. Penalties might be levied depending upon the degree
of circumvention; for example, one possibility enabling access to child
pornography is through a proxy server that bypasses all filtering
measures, so the court could impose the highest possible fine or
incarceration period for this high-level offense. While courts have
struggled to draft and tailor monitoring conditions, a statute with strict
liability language would enable courts to impose clear guidelines and
penalties across the board for all types and levels of circumvention (for
example, the statute may establish one definition of “circumvention” to
include using more than one designated computer at the offender’s
home.) Other definitions of “circumvention” could expand its scope to
address particular instances of software circumvention ostensibly
committed by the savviest offenders, with delineated bright line civil
penalties and mandatory incarceration determined by the nature of the
technique the offender used to circumvent the software.
The strict liability attribute of statutory circumvention penalties also
provides distinct notice to offenders about the consequences of
circumvention, injecting a fortified threat to provide additional
deterrence where the gaps in credibility for probationary violations and
options of alternative punishments currently fall short. Thus, the DMCA
is an excellent model to resolve the software circumvention problem by
providing additional civil and criminal sanctions aimed at offenders who
circumvent technology imposed as a condition of probation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The circuit courts of appeals divide when considering the scope of
restrictive conditions surrounding Internet access for sex offenders
sentenced to probation or supervised release after a conviction for online
trafficking of child pornography. The Second and Eighth Circuits have
reversed Internet restrictions on the ground that such conditions were
overbroad in the context of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. In
contrast, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits acknowledged that careful
tailoring of the language in the condition and careful selection of the
enforcement technology can combine to render restrictive Internet
conditions an entirely appropriate punishment.
and content. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Chilling the Internet?
Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 270,
Mar. 19, 1997, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-270.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
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Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that status as a probationer
or parolee reduces that person’s Fourth Amendment rights, permitting
the inference that a partial or total ban on Internet access does not
infringe on the privacy rights of convicted sex offenders. However,
enforcing such restrictive conditions on Internet access is impractical and
burdensome, due to the impracticalities of curbing offender exposure to
the Internet in modern society. Further, there are prohibitive costs when
training officers to track the offenders’ computer activities using forensic
software, filtering, and monitoring technology.
The credibility crisis in the probationary punishment scheme
weakens the current deterrent value of restrictive conditions against sex
offenders subjected to forensic monitoring or filtering of their Internet
activities. Moreover, statistics highlight the failure of punishment for
probationary violations as a viable threat against non-violent offenders.
In addition, an alternative punishment scheme is not appropriate for
probationers convicted of trafficking online child pornography because
its capacity to “shame” the defendant is likely to be diluted and
ineffective.
Courts often employ legal balancing tests that weigh the totality of
circumstances in each particular lawsuit,186 but bright line rules offer a
certainty of consequence that benefits all participants in the justice
system. Clearly, punishment solely by the terms of probation is not
adequate. Enacting additional and independent criminal and civil
offenses premised on strict liability for any probationer activity that
circumvents the government’s efforts to make safe dual-use technologies
following a conviction for viewing, possessing, or distributing online
child pornography will clarify litigation and give notice to defendants
that restrictions on Internet use are serious measures that warrant
compliance. The deterrent value in such a solution will ensure that the
criminal justice system regains the respect of the public and offender
alike, to prevent any further exploitation of children.

186
Two examples of Totality of the Circumstances tests that evaluate factors under
the Fourth Amendment include determining whether there was probable cause preceding
a search and whether police questioning created an unreasonable atmosphere of coercion.

